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THESIS SUMMARY  
Insurance and hedging instruments can help corporations manage many of the operational 
and financial risks they face. Yet, additional complexities are introduced now that many risks are 
increasingly interdependent and thus strongly correlated, making them more challenging to 
manage.  Few risks illustrate this challenge better than cyber risk.  
This thesis will focus on the increasing attention that the management of cyber risks 
receives in corporations, institutions and industries, and the role that insurance and risk 
management strategies play in mitigating this risk. The decision to focus on cyber risks—and the 
financing and management of those risks—is directly related to the exponential increase in cyber 
threats throughout the global economy. Thirty years ago, few would have predicted the 
magnitude of damage that cyber-attacks would routinely inflict upon organizations of all sizes—
with the potential for far more severe losses looming ever larger. The rapid evolution and 
escalation of cyber threats—along with their ubiquitous nature—has led to a comprehensive 
reassessment of how organizations manage risks of all types.  Insurers have been meeting the 
changing risk management needs of these organizations through innovations in product design, 
which now commonly include elements of loss control and post-event mitigation—in addition to 
traditional loss financing.  
This thesis begins with a historical review of cyber threats and proceeds to examine the 
varied nature of cyber threats impacting several key industries. Data on major attacks for each 
industry examined in this thesis were researched, collected and analyzed, and are displayed in the 
database included in the appendix to this paper.  For the discussion of early-stage cyber threats, I 
will trace the evolution of cyber threats from relatively simplistic denial-of-service attacks, to 
early computer viruses, to phishing emails, and to the multiplicity of sophisticated threats seen 
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today, such as ransomware. The objective is to provide those who are unfamiliar with cyber risk 
(i.e., students or other professionals) with an increased awareness of the threats, as well as an 
understanding of how organizations can mitigate such threats.  
INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-attacks can have long lasting impacts for organizations and companies. The 
financial consequences are potentially substantial—both in terms of direct costs to manage the 
consequences of the attack as well as a company’s share price.  Cyber-attacks can also negatively 
impact a company’s reputation with the public and customers. In the case of healthcare, for 
example, individuals want assurance that their personal and private information is protected; any 
actual or perceived cyber threat against a healthcare institution will jeopardize the presumption 
of privacy and may lead clients to seek healthcare elsewhere.  
Vulnerability to cyber risks is increasing exponentially. Digitization and 
interconnectedness are proceeding at a pace that is faster than what can be realistically managed. 
The rapid progression and evolution of cyber risks are central themes of this thesis.  Specifically, 
I will analyze past examples of cyber-attacks for trends in each of three significantly impacted 
industries: healthcare, transportation, and electoral systems. The research will examine 
vulnerabilities among organizations affected by these attacks. Cyber risk management protocols 
in place at the time of the attacks will be assessed to ascertain the degree and nature of 
vulnerabilities. Opportunities for enhancing cyber risk management will also be identified.  
HISTORY OF CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER RISK 
The rapid evolution, spread, and dependence on digital technologies over the past 25 
years has resulted in an exponential increase in cyber risk. Management of cyber risks is now a 
C-suite and board level issue, with an increasingly sophisticated portfolio of cyber insurance 
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products playing a key role in managing that risk. Cyber insurance has been available since the 
late 1970s, though few organizations took advantage of it. “Following Y2K, the dotcom crash 
and the 9/11 attacks, interest in cyber insurance grew. There was a growing realization that the 
virtual world did not necessarily fit within the scope of many traditional covers/classes of 
insurance” [1]. 
How Y2K Changed Cyber Risk 
In the late 1990s, Y2K and the dotcom boom were the primary drivers of increasing 
awareness of cyber risk and the dangers of interconnectivity of networks. In the article, “The 
Y2K Problem: Social Chaos or Social Transformation?”, explicit fear was expressed by the 
author, John L. Peterson, a futurist specializing in long-range security implications of a rapidly 
changing world. Writing in 1998, Peterson’s article examines societal apprehensions near the 
turn of the millennium. Peterson describes the panic that ensued in the population over the 
perception that the year 2000 might cause chaos for computer systems, despite the seemingly 
innocuous root of the problem. Since the dawn of the computer age in the mid-twentieth century 
and for decades thereafter, computer algorithms created by software engineers utilized a two-
digit (rather than four digit) date format (i.e., 1960 was denoted as “60”), and many feared the 
systems would not have the ability to properly interpret the year 2000 [2]. Peterson further 
asserted at the time that “the year 2000 computer problem could create chaos on an order of 
magnitude we have never seen. Without a spirit of cooperation, we may all suffer” [3].  
The turn of the millennium was an important time in history, because while cyber risks 
were clearly in existence prior to Y2K, mounting concerns over Y2K beginning in the late 1990s 
represent a reasonable historical starting point for the analysis of cyber risks. This is because the 
Y2K period was when this risk first became universally recognized as a societal and economic 
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threat. It is also important to point out that there was increasing recognition that the world had 
become interdependent on technology. “It is that interconnectedness that threatens us if we do 
not match it with the deeper interconnectedness of human beings and communities” [3]. The 
interconnectivity of systems created a terrifying scenario, because no single system could protect 
itself. In the past, many companies operated their own proprietary networks; if one company was 
hacked, then that became an isolated issue which needed to be resolved. Y2K revealed that cyber 
risks are a systemic risk, potentially leading to cascading failures capable of crippling basic 
infrastructure and threatening the economy in general.  
The Interconnectivity of Systems  
Today, most companies are connected—directly or indirectly— to their suppliers, 
vendors, customers, and many other entities and organizations—including some with poor cyber 
risk management protocols or worse, actual malicious intent. Connectivity brings convenience to 
users, but with that convenience comes an elevated risk. This interconnectivity—frequently 
referred to as the “Internet of Things” or IoT—has led to risk management issues so large that it 
has become increasingly necessary and prudent for companies to purchase a separate cyber 
insurance policy to cover the losses that can arise [4].  
The Rise of Cyber Insurance 
Early cyber insurance policies began to gain traction with businesses as a stand-alone 
product in response to Y2K concerns. Such insurance was needed to fill gaps in traditional 
property and casualty products [1]. Cyber insurance generally covers business’ liability for data 
breaches involving sensitive customer information, such as credit card numbers, social security 
numbers, and health records. Cyber insurance also helps with repairing damaged computer 
systems, recovering compromised data, and notifying clients of the data breach [5]. Privacy 
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regulation in the U.S. in the early 2000s served as an additional catalyst fueling increased 
demand for cyber insurance. Increasingly frequent mass data breaches—coupled with greater 
media attention and public concern to the issue resulted in pressure for regulation. A flurry of 
legislative actions ensued.  California was at the vanguard of this regulatory movement with the 
passage of one of the nation’s first breach notification laws, which became effective on July 1, 
2003. “Other states followed, mandating that companies had to immediately disclose a breach to 
customers, usually in writing in addition to the regulatory authorities” [1]. Cyber insurance 
products shifted in response to these new notification requirements toward compensating the 
costs associated with major data breaches, including the costs of notifying customers and 
regulators. The market quickly gained momentum in the U.S. as notification rules expanded 
across multiple sectors and states. As major breaches began to make headlines with ever 
increasing frequency, the demand for cyber insurance grew and the market took off [1]. And as 
cyber-attacks become more damaging, institutions were searching for cyber coverage to protect 
themselves from these risks.  
The increase in frequency and severity of cyber-attacks underscores the important role of 
insurance in managing and mitigating risks. High-profile cases, such as the 2013 Target data 
breach, 2017 Equifax data breach, and the leak of Democratic National Committee emails during 
the 2016 election made national headlines [6]. Indeed, organizations across all industries are 
extremely likely to be the victim of a cyber-attack. Willis Towers Watson, one of the world’s 
largest insurance brokers, in its 2019 Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2 reported that over 32% 
of businesses experienced a cyber-attack within the past year [7]. Cyber insurance can help 
companies by providing teams with expertise in responding to cyber incidents. According to 
Willis Towers Watson, cyber insurance can also help foster a dialogue within an organization: 
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“The application, underwriting, and renewal process can help open up needed conversation 
among an organization’s key leaders about how to best mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. This 
process — which involves questions, advice, and input from a company’s broker and 
underwriter(s) — quickly highlights critical cyber gaps” [8]. Once these gaps are identified, they 
can be analyzed for companies to make investments in cybersecurity that can help to prevent the 
potential loss.  
The Cyber Insurance Solution  
One of the major issues with cybersecurity is the lack of awareness. Many senior 
corporate executives are unaware of the risk and the extent of potential business impacts and 
legal exposure cyber-attacks produce.  “Recent publications by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security and several industry entities report significant increases in the number of 
cyber-attacks against industrial control systems. The sophistication of attacks is also increasing 
as is the likelihood that they will be physically destructive and cause significant loss” [9]. It is 
crucial that organizations of all sizes act proactively and create a cyber-risk plan, rather than 
waiting until after an attack. In addition to the lack of awareness, many institutions are not taking 
advantage of cyber insurance offerings. Looking at the cyber insurance take-up rates for Marsh 
clients in Figure 1, it is apparent that there are gaps in the cyber insurance market, with the 
overall take-up rate for 2019 being only 42% [10]. The take-up rate is the percentage of all 
Marsh clients that purchased the coverage. Although fewer than half of Marsh clients purchased 
cyber insurance in 2019, trends in recent years suggest organizations have a heightened 
appreciation of the risk.  From 2017 to 2019, across all industries the take-up rate increased by 
11 percentage points from 31% to 42%.  Notably, the take-up rate is more than twice the 19% 
recorded in 2014.  
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Take-up rates vary substantially across industries (see Figure 2 [10]). Note that Education 
was the leading buyer of cyber insurance in 2019 with a 74% take-up rate. Healthcare was a 
close second with a 65% take-up rate. The strong demand for coverage is a reflection of the 
significant exposure to loss of personally identifiable information (PPI) and protected health 
information (PHI) across the educational and healthcare sectors.  
The average cost of a data breach varies per industry, with healthcare being the leader. 
Figure 3 [11] displays the average total cost of a data breach by industry. The 2019 study was 
conducted by the Ponemon Institute and the results were analyzed by IBM Security. The results 
are based on a sample of 507 companies [11]. Again, in this study, healthcare was the leading 
industry at an average per data breach being $6.45 million. Health, financial, and energy 
companies are subject to more stringent regulation than industries such as media, hospitality, and 
retail. The increased regulations make these industries more susceptible to higher costs per 
breach. 



















2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
 10 
Figure 2: US Cyber Insurance Take-up Rates by Industry [10] 
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CYBER RISK IN THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR 
The digitization of health records has made many aspects of healthcare administration 
and delivery more efficient, reducing costs and increasing accessibility, but it has also 
dramatically increased the exposure of the healthcare sector to cyber-attacks and data breaches. 
The late 2000s experienced a shift from theft of physical records to hacking of personal and 
medical information within technology systems. There is a vast amount of data regarding data 
breaches within healthcare organizations. Based on the data collected for this study, breaches 
such as email phishing attacks, malware attacks, ransomware attacks, and other various types of 
hacking methods frequently employed to target healthcare organizations. Despite measures that 
providers have in place to prevent data breaches, “…89% of healthcare organizations 
experienced a data breach in the past two years” [12]. Our analysis of the healthcare sector 
reveals much of the industry’s exposed data is related to personal patient information. This 
information includes, but is not limited to: names, addresses, dates of birth, social security 
numbers, insurance contract information and numbers, debit and credit card information, phone 
numbers, and medical information. 
The Digitization of the Healthcare Industry  
The computerization of the healthcare industry overall has increased productivity, which 
has at the same time increased reliance on technology. In one of the biggest healthcare data 
breaches of 2020, Universal Health Services (UHS), one of the largest health networks in the 
United States, was affected at all of their U.S. sites and hospitals. Specifically, on September 27, 
2020, the UHS experienced a ransomware attack which locked company computers and phone 
systems across the country. The suspected cybercriminals used a strain of ransomware known as 
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Ryuk [13]. Due to this attack, doctors and nurses were forced “to rely on paper and pencil for 
record keeping and slowing lab work. Employees described chaotic conditions impeding patient 
care” [14]. This major attack displays the consequences that cyber-attacks can have on 
productivity and operations. 
The privacy of healthcare information has long been a concern of consumers.  The 
Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) enacted in 1996—well before 
the widespread digitization of personal health information—provides for stringent safeguarding 
of such information.  HIPAA remains to this day the single most important piece of federal 
legislation governing health information privacy concerns. The law requires that personal health 
care information must be protected. In 2009, the law further evolved with the passage of the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) under the 
Obama administration. HITECH imposed financial penalties for violations of HIPAA which 
increased the cost of HIPAA noncompliance [15]. Sensitivity associated with the compromise of 
health information is evident in the expensive settlements of healthcare sector cyber-attacks, 
such as in the 2016 Banner Health cyberattack in which an $8.9 million settlement was paid.  
The sheer size of the healthcare sector (nearly 20 percent of the GDP in 2020), the trend 
toward digitization of medical records, and the rapid evolution of medical technology are just 
three of many factors that attract the attention of cyber criminals. Despite many attacks in recent 
years, the healthcare sector remains highly susceptible to debilitating cyber-attacks.   
Issues in Common Healthcare Cybersecurity Practices 
The healthcare industry is known to have had some of the “worst cybersecurity practices 
worldwide” [16]. This analysis of healthcare sector data breaches strongly suggests a systemic 
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problem with data and system security throughout this major economic sector. Violations of 
privacy statutes and allegations of negligence in the wake of data breaches have led to litigation, 
in which class-action lawsuits for large settlements were filed based on accusations that the 
companies involved failed to implement reasonable security protocols. These settlements were so 
substantial because of both the number of patients or records involved and the type of data that 
was exposed. Healthcare data breaches tend to be extremely costly due to the sensitivity of the 
exposed data. In the “2020 IBM Report, the average cost of a data breach reported that the most 
expensive attacks in 2019 occurred in the healthcare sector” [17]. The data that hospitals hold is 
much more profitable compared to other industries. Healthcare credentials are even “more 
valuable than credit card information when sold on the dark web” [18]. The danger in the 
healthcare sector is that a hacker could potentially use one’s identity for years once a certain 
amount of personally identifiable information is obtained through healthcare data breaches.  
Based on our dataset, it is apparent that healthcare organizations both large and small are 
targeted. There has been a steady increase in the number of healthcare data breaches each year. 
Figure 4 shows the number of breaches involving 500 or more records from 2009 to November 
2020 [19 & 20].   
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Figure 4: Healthcare Data Breaches of 500 or More Records per Year [19& 20] 
 
Victims range from large for-profit organizations to small nonprofits.  Small healthcare 
organizations may arguably be a more attractive target, because small providers are still 
struggling with cybersecurity and frequently do not have the human or financial resources 
necessary to keep pace with state-of-the art governance and risk management strategies. Small 
providers struggle with even the most remedial of security protocols such as multi-factor 
authentication (MFA), “…with just half of those providers implementing MFA to shore-up 
potential vulnerabilities” [21].  
Multi-Factor Authentication Protection  
Multi-factor authentication adds an additional layer of protection against one of the most 
common breaches - compromised credentials [22]. Multi-factor authentication helps to insulate 
an organization against remote attacks and can prevent hackers from easily gaining access to 
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Note: These are data breaches of 500 or more healthcare records reported to the Department of Health and 
Human Services' Office for Civil Rights by HIPAA-covered entities and business associates.
*2020 is through November 2020
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effective. With a “push” notification, MFA authentication requests a verification code (often via 
text message or email) in order to login. A trained employee would easily be able to recognize 
activity as suspicious if they have not recently attempted to log into one of their accounts or 
systems. According to ValiMail CEO Alexander Garcia-Tobar, “It only takes one click for a 
person to endanger an entire enterprise” and “healthcare organizations are particularly vulnerable 
to these attacks because awareness about email authentication is still quite low in the sector as a 
whole” [23]. Small-to-medium sized healthcare providers frequently lack the resources to 
implement and maintain robust cybersecurity systems.  Worse still, many are overconfident in 
their current risk management practices—or ignorant of their vulnerabilities. Such failures can 
have significant financial consequences as evidenced by a spate of recent class action lawsuits 
against healthcare providers filed in response to data breaches.  The lawsuits allege negligence 
on the part of those providers in that they failed to take reasonable steps to protect confidential 
patient information. In the case of 21st Century Oncology, the company faced a $2.3 million 
lawsuit with the court finding that it failed to implement security measures to reduce risks while 
also failing to apply procedures to review information system activity regularly [24].  
 Along with the addition of multi-factor authentication, one of the most important aspects 
of risk management that a healthcare organization can introduce is employee training. According 
to Michael Bruemmer, vice president of Experian Data Breach Resolutions, 80% of the incidents 
they serviced had basic employee negligence as a root cause. “That includes such mistakes as 
losing laptops or clicking on phishing emails. ‘Employees are still the weakest link.’” [25]. 
Additionally, healthcare industry data breaches are commonly linked to theft and loss of laptops. 
According to a Data Breach Investigations Report, in which 1,300 data breaches involving 20 
industries were analyzed, “healthcare was the only industry that had theft and loss as a major 
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cause of security incidents” [26]. This accounted for 46% of the security incidents. This further 
demonstrates that employee risk needs to be mitigated in order to help reduce cyber 
vulnerabilities in the healthcare industry. 
Sophistication: A Dynamic Threat 
Cyber threats are dynamic, and the tools, techniques and strategies employed by those 
with malicious intent are becoming increasingly sophisticated—and ever costlier to thwart. 
According to a Ponemon Institute report, “For the 9th year in a row, healthcare organizations had 
the highest cost of a breach – nearly $6.5 million on average (over 60% more than other 
industries in the study)” [27]. This lofty cost is partly due to the exponential increase in digitized 
health information and the fact that compromised health records can produce losses for years 
after a breach.  Identity theft is just one such example of potentially long-lived losses.  The 
nature and modality of cyber-attacks is also shifting.  Ransomware attacks, for example, are 
becoming increasingly common. The shift away from offline backups has made companies more 
vulnerable to certain types of attack. According to Raimund Genes, CTO at Trend Micro: 
“Ransomware attacks are surging because attackers have perfected their techniques while 
enterprises in all sectors have failed to address critical security shortcomings” [28]. The ABCD 
incident, that is explained in Appendix I, shows that even companies with advanced 
cybersecurity in place can still become victims of ransomware attacks. While it is not “possible 
to prevent all ransomware attacks, risk can be reduced to an acceptable level with cybersecurity 
solutions and securely stored backups of data will ensure ransom demands will not have to be 
paid” [29].  
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The ever-increasing sophistication of cyber-attack strategies underscores the critical need 
for healthcare organizations to implement multi-layered security systems and encryption to help 
ensure that patient data cannot be accessed by unauthorized third parties [30]. This is particularly 
crucial because the healthcare industry accounts for a large share of economic activity in the 
United States. In 2019, health spending accounted for 17.7% of the nation’s gross domestic 
product [31].  
Our analysis of major cyber-attacks on the healthcare industry (see appendix) reveals that 
a substantial proportion of healthcare organizations were not prepared when attacked. Even those 
who believed they were prepared clearly underestimated the threat.  There is no question that the 
confidential health data of millions of Americans remains extremely vulnerable to cyber-attack 
and employee negligence.  Failure to mitigate against these risks is very costly.  Consequently, 
data security is one of the healthcare industry’s biggest concerns today and will remain as such 
for the foreseeable future [32].  
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR  
Transportation networks are particularly vulnerable to cyber risks due to increased 
digitization, vast amounts of data flowing across systems and the immediate impact disruptions 
can have on travel and supply chains. As more systems and devices are connected—directly or 
indirectly—the more vulnerable this industry becomes. Advances in communications across 
electronic networks have caused the potential of disruption to become a serious concern. The 
interconnected data systems of different branches of the transportation infrastructure including 
automobiles, aviation, shipping, railways, and trucking compound the likelihood of cyber-attacks 
causing significant interference and material economic disruption [33]. 
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In the automobile industry, software and electronic components are increasingly 
prevalent in modern vehicles. According to McKinsey & Company, the software market for 
vehicles “is expected to grow from USD 238 billion in 2020 to USD 469 billion in 2030, 
corresponding to an annual growth of over 7 percent per year” [34]. This growth is driven by 
innovation in four areas: autonomous cars, connectivity, electric cars, and car sharing. Various 
studies have analyzed the cybersecurity threats to autonomous vehicles. In general, as the degree 
of vehicle autonomy increases, the increased dependence on computerized control systems 
increases vulnerability to hacking. “Without sufficient security, vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to 
infrastructure communication channels can be hacked, which can lead to serious accidents” [35].  
Autonomous Vehicles: An Evolving Risk 
The market for autonomous vehicles is growing rapidly. “According to a new forecast 
from International Data Corporation (IDC), the number of vehicles capable of at least Level 1 
autonomy will increase from 31.4 million units in 2019 to 54.2 million units in 2024, 
representing a five-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 11.5%” [36]. See Figure 5 
below for a visualization of this information. The Level 1 autonomy described here is established 
by the Society of Automotive Engineers and consists of “…driver assistance that may assist 
active steering, breaking, or acceleration; however, the driver still remains responsible and in 
control of the vehicle [36].  
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Figure 5: Expected Growth for Autonomous Vehicles [36] 
 
          The movement of car sales and customer data to online platforms makes the industry 
increasingly susceptible to cyber-attacks. In 2019, 198 million car buyer records were exposed in 
a massive data leak from a car buyer marketing database, DealerLeads. The database that 
included names, email addresses, phone numbers, and street addresses, was found to be 
insecurely posted online [37]. DealerLeads was able to password-protect the database once 
notified, but the data had already been exposed. In reaction to the event, Jonathan Knudsen, a 
senior security strategist at Synopsys, said “all that was needed was a simple policy that every 
internet-facing system needs: password protection, data encryption, or other fundamental 
protections” [37]. This breach highlights the necessity of an increase in security measures within 
the automobile industry. 
Cyber Risk in the Aviation Industry 
      Further, the aviation industry faces similar challenges and susceptibility. With the 






















number of aircraft—including large passenger aircraft carrying hundreds of passengers—are 
today connected to the internet, which raises concerns over potential cyber-attacks. Overall, 
commercial aircraft have never been safer. Technical advances have reduced the chances of an 
accident, but much of the improvement in aviation safety is derived from the computerization of 
flight systems, both internal and external to the aircraft. These computer systems are critical to 
essential operations such as inflight control and navigation systems, air traffic control, and 
passenger reservations. Marsh emphasizes, “As aircraft move ever closer to becoming fully e-
enabled and automation increases, pilot practices and training will need to adapt in the event of 
system failure or security breach” [33]. In 2015, LOT Polish Airlines suffered a DDoS attack 
which caused the airline's computers to crash. It also destroyed its flight plan IT system. This 
resulted in a 5-hour disruption that saw 10 flight cancellations, 12 flight delays, and 1,400 
passengers grounded. Flights midair were luckily unaffected [38]. Due to the loss of crucial 
flight information, David Emm, principal security researcher at Kaspersky Lab postulates: “This 
story highlights the fact that, as more and more aspects of our lives become cyber-dependent, we 
offer a greater attack surface to cybercriminals – including critical infrastructure systems” [39]. 
There is no question that the aviation industry’s increasing dependence on globally 
interconnected digital platforms will only amplify risks in the years ahead. 
Cyber Risk in the Rail Industry 
Comparably, Rail transportation IT systems require high levels of accessibility. Rail 
infrastructure is particularly vulnerable due to multiple types of risks. One risk is that railway 
driver assistance and control systems are highly interconnected. If these systems are infiltrated, 
serious consequences could arise including loss of control of one or more trains [40].  
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Transportation system vulnerabilities are present throughout the world and hackers need not be 
sophisticated to be successful. The public transportation in Lodz, Poland, was attacked in 2008 
when a “14-year-old modified a TV remote control so that it could be used to change track 
points. The teenager broke into a number of tram depots to gather the information needed to 
build the device, which turned the tram system in Lodz into his own personal train set. As a 
result, four vehicles were derailed injuring twelve people” [33]. Other rail systems have been 
attacked, such as the ransomware attack on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
(MBTA) in October 2020. Hackers obtained personal information from workers for MBTA’s 
commuter rail operator, Keolis, and posted it online in attempt to blackmail the company. Keolis 
took the systems that were affected offline, notified law enforcement, and took steps to restore 
the affected systems [41]. Ticketing, rail information systems and system websites represent 
additional nodes of vulnerability because of the potential for customer financial information to 
be exposed.  Ticket validity is also a concern and websites are vulnerable to multitude of attack 
modalities [40].  
Cyber Risk in the Trucking Industry 
Within the trucking industry, connected systems continue to grow. In October 2019, the 
Volvo Group passed the milestone of one million connected customer assets in terms of 
delivered trucks, buses, and construction equipment [42]. This connectivity is expected to 
increase sustainability, uptime, and traffic safety. Connectivity is expected to continue to expand 
exponentially. According to a McKinsey Global Institute discussion paper, Connected World: An 
evolution in connectivity beyond the 5G revolution, citing a recent International Data 
Corporation (IDC) estimate, “there could be up to 42 billion connected IoT devices by 2025” 
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[43]. The more connected transportation networks become, the more vulnerable they are to cyber 
risk.   
Cyber Risk in the Freight Industry    
Analogous to the trucking industry, the shipping industry is likewise vulnerable but on a 
global scale. Ships utilize electronic navigation devices such as the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) which if interfered with, can cause serious trouble for ship operators, increasing the 
likelihood of crashing [44]. Additionally, maritime operations use millions of data points each 
week, making it crucial for shipping lines to have this data stored securely [45]. In 2017, a cyber-
attack against Maersk, a global shipping company, disrupted operations for two weeks and cost 
the company around $300 million. Maersk was hit by a worm named NotPetya, which locked 
access to systems that the company uses to operate shipping terminals worldwide. No data was 
lost, and ships operated normally throughout the period the systems were down. However, for up 
to two days, the affected terminals could not move cargo, resulting in significant losses from 
worldwide delays [46]. In order for maritime operators to mitigate attacks, they must have a 
cybersecurity plan and take steps to strengthen firewalls to stop attacks like the Maersk attack 
from happening [45].  
Despite an evolving risk landscape, with cyber risk moving up the ladder, certain 
companies are still choosing not to purchase cyber coverage. According to Aon’s 2019 Global 
Risk Management Survey, less than half (44%) of the transportation service companies (non-
aviation) purchased cyber insurance coverage, and 35% of companies had no plan of purchasing 
cyber-insurance (See Figure 6). The aviation industry is better off, with 69% who have 
purchased coverage and only 19% with no plans to purchase [47].  
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Research and analysis reveal that transportation organizations of many different types 
and sizes are targeted. Many of those attacked were not prepared at the time of the attack nor had 
a plan in place of what to do after the initial attack. The development and implementation of 
comprehensive cyber-risk management plans—plans which include the purchase of proper 
insurance coverage—are critically important in the transportation sector given the extreme 
interdependence of transportation risks with virtually every other major industry sectors. 
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Figure 6: Purchase of Cyber Insurance Coverage by Industry [47] 
 
ELECTIONS  
Elections are vulnerable to a wide variety of cybersecurity risks due to the rapid adoption 
of and increasing reliance on digital election infrastructure. This vulnerability came to the 
forefront in the United States for the first time during the 2008 presidential campaign and has 
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between Democrat Barack Obama and his Republican rival John McCain, the FBI uncovered a 
massive cyberespionage operation against both campaigns.  The operation was ultimately traced 
back to the People's Republic of China. The goal of the campaign intrusion was thought to be to 
export internal data from both campaigns. This included internal position papers and private 
emails to gain leverage with the winner of the election. The intrusion into the campaign's 
computer networks continued for months after first being detected by the FBI in the summer of 
2008. The attack was initially delivered by a "phishing" email which contained an attachment 
with sophisticated malware that infiltrated the Obama campaign's computer system [49]. This 
malware allowed threat actors to exfiltrate data from both campaigns. This event was particularly 
significant because it was the first time that a foreign actor had exfiltrated large quantities of 
information from a United States presidential race for potential use by a foreign government 
[50]. Fortunately, in the 2012 elections, there were no documented instances of digital foul play 
or malicious hacking [51]. Although there was no concrete evidence of a hack from the 2012 
election, that does not mean that the large potential threat was nonexistent. Indeed, it is possible 
that infiltrations occurred but went undetected or were detected but not publicly revealed. 
During the United States’ 2016 presidential election cycle, the Obama administration 
accused Russia of interference. In a joint statement from the U.S. Intelligence Community and 
the Department of Homeland Security, the agencies announced that “The U.S. Intelligence 
Community is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of emails 
from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. These thefts and 
disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S. election process” [52]. Hackers created a fake 
email account to send phishing emails to over 30 of Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton’s 
staffers. The emails included a link that directed to a document titled "hillaryclinton-favorable-
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rating.xlsx". This led to a website operated by the hackers where they were able to use stolen 
credentials to access the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee network and steal 
data. They accessed 33 Democratic National Committee (DNC) computers and registered for a 
website called ‘DC leaks’ to publicize the documents [53]. Special Counsel Robert Mueller, 
charged with investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election, issued an indictment 1 of 
twelve Russian intelligence officers in the hacking of the DNC and the Clinton campaign. It was 
hoped that the indictment would have a deterrent effect and reduce the likelihood of future 
attacks [54].   
While vulnerabilities in election systems certainly remain, much has been done in the 
United States to strengthen the cyber defenses. Before the 2018 midterms, 40 states invested 
more than $75 million of federal and state funds to secure election systems after the 2016 
election. This also includes 26 states that conducted security assessments and implemented 
cybersecurity upgrades, 20 states that enhanced cybersecurity training for election officials, 15 
states that upgraded voting equipment, and 9 states that expanded post-election audits [55].  
While it is impossible to directly assess what impact, if any, the Mueller indictments had on 
reducing foreign interference in the 2020 presidential, there is clear evidence that the cyber threat 
was diminished. In late November 2020, Christopher Krebs, director of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), claimed the election had been “the most secure in U.S. 
history” and “there was no indication of evidence that there was any sort of hacking or 
compromise of election systems on, before or after November 3” [56]. Krebs was subsequently 
fired by President Trump for speaking out against his various assertions that the election had, in 
fact, been stolen. Yet state, local and national election officials appear to have taken threats 
 
1 This indictment detailed the accusation by the American government of the Russian government interference in the 
2016 election. From https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download.  
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manifested in the 2016 election seriously, implementing multiple security measures to ensure the 
validity and integrity of the election process.  
Direct cyber-attacks are far from the only means available to perpetrators of election 
interference. Misinformation and disinformation can also undermine public confidence in the 
election process. Ahead of the 2020 presidential election, CISA released a resource guide 
designed to counter some of the more common rumors contributing to public concerns over 
security of election infrastructure and related processes [57]. This CISA guide provides an in-
depth analysis of voting system processes in the United States and dispels numerous false 
assertions, including suggestions that election software is not reviewed or tested beforehand. 
CISA went further still, issuing a joint statement in November 2020 with the Elections 
Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council and other groups. The collective opinion of this 
consortium of experts on election integrity, as it applies to the 2020 presidential race, is that 
recounts are to be expected when elections are close.  The process has built-in redundancies 
(e.g., paper ballots to back up votes cast electronically) that allow for the identification and 
correction of any mistakes or errors [58]. CISA and its partners conclude that despite numerous 
claims to the contrary, there was “no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, 
changed votes, or was in any way compromised” during the 2020 presidential election cycle 
[58].  
While the 2020 election was more secure than those of the past, in October 2020, 
Trustwave, a global cybersecurity company, discovered a hacker was selling personally 
identifying information on 186 million American voters. Much of the data was already publicly 
available, but names, email addresses, and voter registration records were found for sale on the 
dark web. While voter registration data is publicly available in most states, email addresses are 
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often not included in that public data. The databases were listed for sale by "Greenmoon2019'' 
and potentially enabled malicious actors to target registered Democrats or Republicans through 
email. Zid Mador, the vice president of security research at Trustwave, pointed out: “In the 
wrong hands, this voter and consumer data can easily be used for geotargeted disinformation 
campaigns over social media, email phishing and text and phone scams before, during and after 
the election, especially if results are contested” [59]. 
While much of America’s attention was focused on securing the presidential election 
system, one of the biggest known thefts of cybersecurity tools occurred. FireEye2, one of the 
largest cybersecurity companies in the United States, announced on December 8, 2020, foreign 
government hackers with "world-class capabilities" broke into their network and stole tools that 
they use to test the defenses of thousands of customers including federal, state, and local 
governments. FireEye partners with a wide range of insurance companies including Marsh, 
Lockton, Beazley, and Sompo International. FireEye's CEO, Kevin Mandia, released in a 
statement that the attacker "primarily sought information related to certain government 
customers." Mandia also stated that he has concluded that the attack was completed by a nation 
with "top-tier offensive capabilities” [60]. The motive behind the attack remains unclear. 
Just five days after the FireEye attack was announced, a much larger attack on IT 
monitoring and management software SolarWinds stole the headlines.  SolarWinds clients 
include many of the largest technology, telecommunications and consulting firms in the world—
along with many agencies of numerous national governments, including the United States. The 
attacks on FireEye and SolarWinds led to a broader investigation as to whether the Russian 
 
2 FireEye is a publicly traded cybersecurity company (FEYE). On December 8, 2020 (the day the attack was 
announced) the stock was trading at 15.52 and dropped to 13.49 on December 9th, representing a decrease of 13%.  
From https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/FEYE/ 
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hackers had achieved in infiltrating both federal and private networks [61]. In a statement on 
December 13, 2020, the Russian Embassy in Washington denied any involvement. If Russia’s 
connection is confirmed in this attack, it will be “the most sophisticated known theft of American 
government data since a two-year spree in 2014 and 2015, in which Russian intelligence 
agencies gained access to the unclassified email systems at the White House, the State 
Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It took years to undo the damage...” [61]. This 
expansive hack could have long lasting potential effects on affected organizations. 
There are a multitude of reasons as to why voting systems in the United States are 
particularly vulnerable. In a New York Times article, “The Crisis of Election Security” the 
susceptibility of America’s voting systems is analyzed through the past elections. It asks and 
answers: “How did our election system get so vulnerable, and why haven’t officials tried harder 
to fix it? The answer, ultimately, comes down to politics and money: The voting machines are 
made by well-connected private companies that wield immense control over their proprietary 
software, often fighting vigorously in court to prevent anyone from examining it when things go 
awry” [62]. The risk of cyber-attacks to election infrastructure is not new. The history of Russian 
theft alone of critical data from the U.S. government spans across more than two decades and 
resulted in the creation of the United States Cyber Command, which is the Pentagon’s evolving 
cyberwarfare force [61]. Then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, in a radio talk show interview 
with Mark Levin said it was “pretty clear” that Russia was behind the security attack against the 
United States in 2020. He also said that Russia was on the list of people who “want to undermine 
our way of life, our republic, [and] our basic democratic principles… you see the news of the day 
with respect to their efforts in cyberspace. We’ve seen this for an awfully long time, using 
asymmetric capabilities to try and put themselves in a place where they can impose costs on the 
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United States” [63]. It was not until three weeks after the realization of the attack that the United 
States formally named Russia as the likely source in a joint statement issued by the FBI, 
Department of Homeland Security, Director of National Intelligence, and National Security 
Agency [64]. 
Election Security in Countries Outside the United States 
 
Other countries are also plagued by cyber-attacks in election processes, often with 
different vulnerabilities being targeted. Figure 7 displays statistics from a study in which 26 
countries were asked about the likelihood and preparation for cyber-attacks on national security 
information, public infrastructure, and elections in their country. A striking 74% of these 
countries said that it was likely that their country’s sensitive national security information was 
being accessed [65].  
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Figure 7: Perceived Likelihood of Cyber-attacks within 26 Countries [65] 
 
Estonia was one of the first countries to be attacked in the first major act of cyber 
warfare.  In 2007, the Estonian government decided to move the Bronze Soldier, a symbol of 
Soviet oppression. This decision led to protests which were exacerbated by false Russian news 
reports that claimed the statue was being destroyed; when it was in reality being moved. In this 
rioting, 156 people were injured, one person died, and 1,000 people were detained. Additionally, 
the day after the physical destruction, cyber-attacks affected online services of Estonian banks, 
media outlets, and government bodies. Also, a massive volume of spam email was sent by 
botnets, generating large numbers of online requests and overloading servers. Estonians were 
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Note: Percentages are medians based on 26 countries. "Likely" includes those who say a cyberattack is "very" or 
"somewhat" likely and those who volunteer that such attacks have already happened. 
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newspapers could not deliver news [66]. Estonia faced lost productivity, opportunity cost, 
remediation, and acquiring alternative web services at emergency rates that is estimated to have 
cost billions of Euro [67]. Positively, this event transformed Estonia. Estonia was hit particularly 
hard because it is heavily dependent on online processes and digital infrastructure. In 2008, it 
was estimated that Estonia was “97% dependent on internet banking” [67].  This event was a 
“wake-up call, helping Estonians become experts in cyber defense today” [66]. The country’s 
leading IT experts are trained by the Ministry of Defense. The event helped to earn Estonia a 
reputation today as a country with extremely strong cyber security. This example was one of the 
first attacks on one nation by another. Russia has been involved in a multitude of hacks against 
other nations including, most notably, the United States, Lithuania, and Kyrgyzstan [67].   
Ten years later, in 2017, the French were able to successfully counter Russian electoral 
interference. Two days before the final round of the French presidential elections, data hacked 
from Emmanuel Macron’s presidential campaign team were released online. Nearly 14.5 
gigabytes of emails and personal and business documents were posted to the site Pastebin 
through links to more than 70,000 files. Officials from Macron’s party said that the attackers 
mixed fake documents and authentic ones to create confusion and misinformation. One of the 
reasons the hack was unsuccessful was the speed at which the issue was addressed. Throughout 
the campaign, the susceptibility to hacking was communicated openly and all hacking attempts 
were made public. This attempt was announced within a few hours. Additionally, a few hours 
after the documents were released online, the French mandated period of 48 hours of reflection 
prior to an election, where the media and campaigns are silent, began. This ‘blackout’ period of 
mainstream media, which the United States does not implement, helped to make the attempt 
unsuccessful at deterring popular opinion of the elect. France was able to anticipate, react, and 
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coordinate its response between the Macron campaign staff, the government, and civil society 
[68].   
Misinformation and Disinformation 
Democratic elections rely heavily on faith in the electoral process.  Therefore, the 
deliberate introduction and spread of false information can increase voter confusion and devalue 
a fact-based political debate. In recent years, social media has been the platform of choice for 
disrupting elections through the dissemination of both misinformation and disinformation, 
though other electronic methods exist—including ordinary email. The result is a blurring of lines 
between truth and fiction. The difference between misinformation and disinformation is 
important and is based on intention. Misinformation occurs when false information is spread, 
regardless of the intent to mislead [69]. Disinformation is the “deliberate generation and 
dissemination of false information to manipulate public opinion and perceptions…” The rapid 
spread of misinformation and disinformation online has led many organizations to strengthen 
cyber security safeguards [70].  
Today, most major social media platforms invest heavily in content screening, including 
political content. After the 2016 presidential election, Facebook hired thousands of third-party 
moderators located in the Philippines, India, Dublin, and the United States to help bolster their 
reputation. There is currently a debate as to whether content moderation is best carried out by 
humans or largely through the use of artificial intelligence (AI). Mary Gray, a senior principal 
researcher at Microsoft Research warned “They [Facebook] haven’t made enough leaps and 
bounds in artificial intelligence to take away the best tool we have: human intelligence to do the 
discernment” [71]. While AI technology is increasingly reliable and is more efficient from a cost 
perspective, overdependence on it can increase the risk of false information spreading across 
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social media. Forms of disinformation vary and quickly evolve. The deception involved in 
disinformation is similar to that of phishing. Facebook had nearly 15,000 contractors at 20 sites 
globally hired to remove pornography, hate speech, terrorism, and other unwanted content from 
its site. The screening process works to detect deception and misinformation. Due to the 
coronavirus pandemic, Facebook in 2020 sent home thousands of these human moderators. The 
social network must now rely more on technology to protect against misinformation [71]. 
Facebook along with other companies, such as Twitter, have used artificial intelligence and 
algorithms, but have recognized that humans are vital to removing some of the content. The 
pressure to combat misinformation regarding a multitude of subjects, including the integrity of 
the 2020 general election in the United State and the COVID-19 pandemic, is high. 
 Overall, there does not need to be a cyber-attack in order to disrupt through online 
platforms. Misinformation and disinformation can be particularly dangerous to elections, because 
they can threaten democracy by spreading deceit. Disinformation campaigns are a means of 
interfering with campaigns digitally which undermines confidence in democracies. Lastly, 
disinformation can damage trust in the media.  
Reliability of Online Content 
Liability associated with content has evolved due to election integrity. With a multitude 
of platforms and many posts, it can be difficult to decipher the validity of information spread 
about Candidates. Recently there has been debate over whether Section 230, which helps 
platforms to moderate posts, should still be upheld. This provision is known as the “twenty-six 
words that created the internet.” Created back in 1996, Section 230 was enacted as a part of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA). Section 230 was originally created after a court ruling 
against the online platform Prodigy. In this case, Prodigy argued that it was not responsible for 
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its users’ speech, but the court treated Prodigy more like a publisher because they moderate some 
of their users’ posts. While being treated like a publisher, a platform would be legally liable for 
misleading or harmful content it ‘publishes’ [72]. Section 230 allowed for companies to 
moderate material on their platforms without being treated like a publisher under law. It says: 
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” [73]. Therefore, 
platforms cannot be held liable for what users post. 
The COVID-19 pandemic caused content to be moderated more closely. Prior to the 
pandemic, misinformation was generally political in nature and was not known to not cause 
immediate harm. False information relating to the Coronavirus, could however, cause direct 
harm. Posts claiming the virus was a hoax may have undermined the credibility of public 
responses that were necessary to slow the spread of the virus and might have encouraged people 
to ignore warnings and gather in groups [74]. As a result, platforms adopted stricter moderation 
policies toward COVID-19 misinformation. In addition to COVID-19, political speech made 
Section 230 one of the most discussed topics of 2020. Donald Trump and other republicans have 
accused tech companies of censoring conservatives. Some have argued that Big Tech has gained 
too much control. Two days after the 2021 storming of the United States Capital on January 6th, 
Twitter suspended President Trump from its platform permanently. Social media companies have 
long been tested by President Trump who violated Twitter’s policy against the glorification of 
violence [75]. Twitter’s announcement said that “After close review of recent Tweets from the 
@realDonaldTrump account and the context around them we have permanently suspended the 




temporarily suspended Trump’s account. Regarding Section 230, tech leaders of Twitter, Jack 
Dorsey, and Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, said they are open to revising the legislation [76]. 
Twitter and Facebook have said their platforms balance between promoting free expression and 
removing harmful content [76]. Democrats, including Joe Biden, have also spoken on the subject 
of Section 230, urging Congress to revise it to help remove hate speech, election interference, 
and false information.  
The debated question is: should these platforms be held liable for the content it holds? 
Both parties push for revision of the act, yet for different reasons. Jen Kosseff, an assistant 
professor of cybersecurity law in the U.S. Naval Academy’s Cyber Science Department, said “it 
would be challenging for Congress to reach consensus on how to alter Section 230” [76]. He also 
mentioned it would be challenging to satisfy everyone who is upset with the big tech companies. 
Repealing Section 230 would ultimately lead to more moderation, because of the increased risk 
of liability of the content that users post.  
COVID-19  
The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated a major shift—already underway prior to the 
pandemic—toward a more digitized workforce and world in general. Many employees are 
working from home and relying on emails and other platforms to communicate with co-workers 
and customers. The increased reliance on digital communications technologies increases the 
probability of both malicious attacks and unintentional breaches. Consistent with the increased 
vulnerability, the FBI has reported a 400 percent increase in cyber-attacks post-COVID [77], 
demonstrating beyond any doubt that malicious actors are exploiting an exponential increase in 
the attack surface. Heightened awareness of cyber threats even before COVID was already 
driving demand for cyber insurance sharply upward. A Zurich Insurance and Advisen Ltd. study 
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reported that the proportion of companies (all sizes) purchasing coverage grew from 34 percent 
in 2011 to around 80 percent in 2020 [77]. Smaller businesses, however, appear less aware, 
willing or able to mitigate the financial consequences of cyber-attacks through the purchase of 
insurance. According to the 2020 CyberScout survey, “64 percent of U.S. SMBs (small and mid-
sized businesses) reported not having cyber insurance coverage for their business and 5 percent 
didn’t know if they have any cyber coverage in their current policy” [78] (See Figure 8). Despite 
a sharp increase in cyber-attacks aimed at employees working from home—especially 
ransomware attacks—the reasons why most SMBs continue to lack cyber insurance coverage 
remains unclear. This disconnect may be attributed to the lack of knowledge and cost. In the 
future of digital work, business plans must prioritize cyber risk as a top business liability. 
Figure 8: Small Businesses with Cyber Policies [78] 
 
Vaccine Vulnerabilities: A Complex Supply Chain  
With respect to the Covid-19 vaccine, criminals will likely try to interrupt the 






security issues, such as ransomware attacks on hospitals and pharmacies. The international police 
organization, Interpol, in early December 2020 issued a Global Orange Notice, which is a serious 
and imminent threat to public safety [79]. The Interpol secretary general warned: “As 
governments are preparing to roll out vaccines, criminal organizations are planning to infiltrate 
or disrupt supply chains” [80]. This has been seen within the first few weeks of distribution. 
IBM’s cybersecurity division found that a series of cyber-attacks were underway that aimed at 
the companies and government organizations distributing the coronavirus vaccines [81]. 
According to the IBM X-Force report, a global phishing campaign targeted organizations within 
the COVID-19 “cold chain” began as early as September 2020. This cold chain refers to the step 
of the vaccine supply chain that ensures preservation of the vaccines in a temperature-controlled 
environment during both storage and transportation [82]. Nick Rossmann, who leads IBM’s 
global threat intelligence teams, said that the cyber-attacks “were working to get access to how 
the vaccine is shipped, stored, kept cold, and delivered” [81]. This attack emphasizes the need 
for cybersecurity diligence at each step of the vaccine supply chain.   
CONCLUSION  
The evolution of cyber risk in the past 25 years has caused the risk to become extremely 
prevalent in today’s society creating an increasingly sophisticated market for cyber insurance. 
Companies are increasingly dependent on technology, which increases their exposure to cyber 
threats. Multiple factors affect the risks that corporations face. Three of the most afflicted sectors 
of cyber risk were analyzed: healthcare, transportation, and electoral systems. Risk mitigation 
continues to be the goal of corporations, with an increasing focus on cyber risk. One of the most 
important aspects of mitigating cyber risk will be awareness. As businesses become more 
connected and interdependent on technology, they become more vulnerable to these types of 
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attacks. I foresee the next wave of cyber risk will be pertaining to personal medical data being 
held by the companies creating apps for vaccine passports4. With an ever-changing world that is 
constantly evolving technologically, there will always be cyber risks.  Cyber insurance coverage 
needs to be part of every policy. I hope that companies and organizations are preparing for the 
future by implementing technologies to enhance cyber resilience.   
Cyber insurance coverage should be part of a company’s multifaceted defense strategy 
against cyber risks. Some other defenses that should be implemented include Multi-factor 
Authentication (MFA), password protection, data encryption, and employee awareness training.  
I would lastly like to thank my director, Dr. Robert Hartwig, for his outstanding role in 
guiding me through this research and writing process. I would also like to thank my second 
reader, Gregory Niehaus, for his time and expertise during this process.  
  
 
4 Ideas on vaccination passport apps currently remain uncertain. An analog approach that does not need an app to 
work would be more accessible, cheaper, and more privacy concerning. A semi-digital approach (that EU is 
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Appendix I: Healthcare 
Entity, Date, and 
Type of Attack 
Summary Records Lost Financial 
Loss/Impact 
Resolution (date) Adjustments to Cyber Risk 
Management 
Anthem Blue 




An unknown hacker accessed a database that had personal 
information such as names, birthdays, social security 







Anthem paid out $115 M 
to settle lawsuits (June 
2017). 
Anthem provided free credit 
monitoring and identity 
protection services to all who 







An internal alert notified Dominion National of unauthorized 
access to computer servers that breached data from as early 
as August 2010. This data varied, but included names, Social 
Security numbers, taxpayer identification numbers, bank 
account and routing numbers, member ID numbers, group 












handling of the 
data. 
Individuals were notified 
(investigation ended 
April 2019). 
The insurer has enhanced its 
monitoring and alerting 
software. Dominion National 
reported the security incident to 
the FBI. All of the patients 
received two years of credit and 







Ransomware encrypted files that contained protected health 
data. The attack is believed to have started with the 
download of the Emotet Trojan, which has been used in 
several attacks. The exposed information includes names, 
addresses, dates of birth, social security numbers, insurance 
contract information and numbers, phone numbers, and 





notifications to affected 
individuals (notified by 
March 2019). 
Affected patients received free 
access to credit monitoring and 









In October of 2018, Accudoc informed that an unauthorized 
party gained access to Accudoc's third party vendor, 
AccuDoc Solutions in late September. Impacted information 
included names, addresses, dates of birth, social security 




Individuals were notified 
(starting October 2018). 
Accudoc brought on a forensic 
firm to help secure its database. 
They also contacted the FBI. 
Those whose SSNs were 
exposed were offered free credit 






MSK Group discovered that its computer networks 
experienced a security event. After investigation, they did not 
believe records containing personal information were 
removed from the computer network; however, there was 
unauthorized access to the network that stored personal 
information such as driver's licenses, SSNs, insurance, and 




patients [88].  
 
Individuals were notified 
(approximately July 9, 
2018). 
Offered individuals one year of 
free identify theft protection 
services. 
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The institute began notifying over 5,000 patients in 
September 2020 that their personal health information was 
exposed during an email phishing incident. An unauthorized 
individual gained access to a Piedmont Cancer's employee 
email account between April 5 and May 8. Personal 
information that was exposed includes names, birthdays, 
financial account information, and debit and credit card 
information [89].  
5226 patients 
 
Individuals were notified 
(September 2020). 
Piedmont implemented 
multifactor authentication across 
its emails and added additional 





The health system's email system was hit by a series of 
targeted phishing emails that appeared to be sent from an 
executive within UnityPoint. An employee fell for the email 
thereby giving hackers access to internal email accounts from 
March 14 to April 3, 2018. It was found that the hackers 
were likely attempting to divert vendor or payroll payments. 
The hacked accounts' data that was exposed included names, 
addresses, medical data, treatment information, lab results, 






The settlement provided 
the breach victims with 
monetary relief, 
including 1 year of 
comprehensive credit 
monitoring and identify 
theft protection services 
(June 2020). 
UnityPoint reset the passwords 
to the compromised accounts, 
added phishing education for 
employees, added secure tools to 









Attackers used a sophisticated malware to bypass 
Community Health System's Security and was able to copy 
and transfer information out of the system. The compromised 
information included names, addresses, birthdays, phone 






According to Iowa's 
Attorney General, CHS 
failed to implement 
reasonable security 
practices. They faced a 
six-year lawsuit relating 
to this wrongdoing 
(October 2020) [92].  
CHS agreed to "implement and 
maintain a comprehensive 
information security program” to 






Banner reported that their computer servers and systems that 
process payment card data at certain Banner Health food and 
beverage outlets were affected in the attack. The attack was 
targeting payment card data including cardholder names, 
card numbers, expiration dates and internal verification 
codes. For the providers: names, addresses, birthdays, Tax 
identification numbers, National Provider Identifier numbers, 






Lawsuit was due to 
victims claiming that 
Banner failed to 
thoroughly investigate 
and harden their systems 
against risks (April 
2020). 
Banner claimed to be enhancing 
the security of its systems. 
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ABCD Pediatrics discovered that someone gained 
unauthorized access to its servers and used ransomware to 
encrypt data. The attack involved a ransomware called 
Dharma. The encryption process was stopped by the anti-
virus solution used by ABCD Pediatrics, isolating the 
affected servers and taking them offline. The type of 
information that was potentially compromised includes 
patients' names, addresses, phone numbers, demographic 
information, SSNs, insurance billing information, and 




N/A Individuals were 
notified; impacted 
individuals received 
credit monitoring and 
identity theft protection 
services for one year 
(notified after March 
2018). 
The investigation found the 
source of the attack and 
additional security solutions such 
as state-of-the-art network cyber 
monitoring were added to 
ABCD's security measures. 




Type: Breach of 
client information 
An investigator found that clients' personal information was 
publicly available on the internet from July 2015 to February 
2018 [96]. 
3,751 clients $200,000 
penalty to the 
state 
In Match, 2018, clients 
were formally notified. 
They were provided with 
a one-year subscription 
to LifeLock to protect 
against identity theft. 
The case was handled by 
the Bureau of Internet 
and Technology Deputy 
Bureau Chief, Clark 
Russell. The Arc of Erie 
County paid $200,00 in 
fees for violating 
HIPAA (August 2018). 
The Arc of Erie County 
announced that it will review its 
policies and analyze its 
vulnerabilities of all electronic 







A criminal group that is believed to be located in Eastern 
Europe obtained the log in credentials of a vendor that 
provides hardware for one of the information systems used 
by the hospital. SamSam malware was used to encrypt data 
files associated with this system. Messages appeared on the 
hospital PC screens saying that the system was encrypted 
using SamSam ransomware, it also demanded a payment be 
made within seven days or there would be permanent 
encryption of the data. The CEO decided to pay the ransom 
of four bitcoin to retrieve the private encryption keys. It 
appears patient data was not transferred outside of the 
hospital's network [97].  
N/A purpose 





4 Bitcoin in 
ransom 
Friday evening, Hancock 
paid the four-bitcoin 
transaction to receive the 
private keys from the 
attackers. Critical 
systems were restored by 
Monday (1/14/2018). 
Hancock validated that the files 
were safely recovered, encrypted 
files were deleted, and 
information systems were 
brought back online. 
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Type: Data breach 
It was discovered by the FBI that an unauthorized individual 
accessed and stole information from one of their patient 
databases. It was accessed by a Remote Desktop Protocol 
from an exchange server that contained protected health 






21st Century Oncology 
agreed to pay the Human 
Services’ Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR) $2.3 
million and to adopt a 
corrective plan of action 
to bring its policies up to 
standards of HIPAA 
(December 2017). 
21st Century Oncology agreed to 
adopt a corrective action plan 
that included revising its policies 
and procedures or reporting 
violations of HIPAA rules, and 
training staff on the new 









Officials discovered that some electronic health information 
was left online that was exposed y a webpage that allowed 
search engines to index Inmediata's internal webpages. The 
webpage was then deactivated, and the compromised data 
was found to include patient names, addresses, birthdays, 
gender, and medical claims data. There was no evidence of 







Individuals were emailed 
beginning April 22, 
2019. It was found that 
there were mailing 
mistakes, and some 
patients claimed to 
receive multiple letters 
addressed to other 
patients (ongoing 
lawsuits) [100].  
The company has implemented 
new server and database 
procedures, as well as additional 
security to avoid future incidents 






Patients of the Mayfield Clinic of Cincinnati were sent an 
email that contained an attachment which downloaded 
ransomware onto the patients' devices. The victims were told 
they needed to pay a ransom to unlock the encryption. No 
personal or medical data was accessed, just the emails. 
Mayfield was able to alert many of the people on the email 




Mayfield used a 
computer virus 
protection service, and 
all recipients of the 
email were sent 
information to download 
software to remove the 
ransomware virus 
(February 2016). 
Mayfield assessed its controls 
and provided anti-scanning 
updates to employee emails. It 
also discontinued the distribution 







Universal Health Services experienced a ransomware attack 
on September 27. This attack locked computers and phone 
systems across UHS facilities in the United States. The 
suspected cybercriminals use a strain of ransomware known 
as Ryuk. This attack forced doctors and nurses to rely on 
paper and pencil for record keeping, which slowed lab work. 












The systems were 
quickly disconnected, 
and the network was 
shut down to prevent 
further destruction. The 
UHS IT Network was 
restored (10/5/2020). 
The recovery and restoration 
process were enacted by UHG, 
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EasyJet (a low-cost airline based in England) was the target 
of a "highly sophisticated" cyberattack which exposed the 
email addresses and travel plans of about 9 million 
customers. Around 2,000 of the customers had their credit 












personal data of 
its customers. 
This will likely 
result in a heavy 
fine. 
The company contacted 
individuals affected by 
the end of May 2020.  
The airline got in contact with 
the National Cyber Security 
Centre, a British organization 
that helps companies avoid 
computer security threats and 
the Information 
Commissioner’s Office 
(British agency that reviews 
data breaches). 
British Airways  
June 2018 
Type: Data breach 
A variety of information was compromised including log in 
information, payment cards, and travel booking details of 










Office (ICO) for 




The 183 million pound 
fine from the ICO was 
reduced to 20m due to 
the airline's financial 
circumstances. The 
investigators found that 
British Airways had 
failed to put sufficient 
security measures in 
place to protect its 
customer's data (7/2019).  
British airways planned to 
make improvements to the 






Hackers used a botnet to decipher customer login credentials 
used for the airline's online portal. Hackers then made 
purchases using miles on users' frequent flyer accounts. 
According to Lufthansa, the damage was limited to a few 
hundred accounts. The miles and travel vouchers that were 
stolen were returned to their owners. Lufthansa's IT 
department identified fraudulent activity and discovered 
'Bots' trying to use usernames and passwords until obtaining 





N/A For the accounts 
affected, Lufthansa has 
reimbursed them and 
changed the account 
numbers and contacted 
members to change their 
usernames and 
passwords (April 2015) 
[106].  
The account information of 
all customers was changed. 
No other risk mitigation plan 
was explicitly mentioned.   
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On Black Friday 2016, a cryptic message blocked access to 
SFTMA's computer screens reading "You hacked, ALL Data 
Encrypted." The hacker's goal was to obtain 100 bitcoins 
($73,000) from SFTMA for the release of its symptoms. The 
malware infected about 1/4 of SFTMA's computer systems 
and gained access to physical ticketing machines. SFTMA 
was forced to give free rides to passengers that weekend, and 
the bus drivers resorted to hand-written routes. SFTMA 
denied paying the ransom and restored the systems on their 












was unable to 
collect fares. 
By Sunday the computer 
systems were restored, 
and an official statement 
was released: "Transit 
service was unaffected 
and there were no 
impacts to the safe 
operation of buses and 
Muni Metro. Neither 
customer privacy nor 
transaction information 
were compromised. The 
situation is now 
contained, and we have 
prioritized restoring our 
systems to be fully 
operational” 
(11/27/2016) [108].  
Not explicitly stated in 
prevention of future attackers 
obtaining this information. It 
was mentioned that SFMTA 
would reach out to staff to 
remind them of the impacts of 
clicking on links and opening 
emails from unfamiliar 
sources. 





Hackers obtained personal information from workers for the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
commuter rail operator, Keolis, and posted it online to 
attempt to blackmail the company. Keolis took the systems 
that were affected offline, notified law enforcement, and took 





N/A For impacted employees, 
Keolis provided credit 
monitoring and identity 
theft protection (October 
2020).  





Denial of Service 
(DDoS) Attack 
In 2015, LOT Polish Airlines suffered a DDoS attack which 
caused the airline's computers to crash. It also destroyed its 
flight plan IT system. This resulted in a 5-hour disruption 
that saw 10 flight cancellations, 12 flight delays, and 1,400 






N/A No direct access to the 
data was obtained. The 
passengers affected flew 
on later flights or were 
put up in hotels by LOT 
(June 2015). 
Thee chief executive 
emphasized “This is an 
industry problem on a much 
wider scale, and for sure we 
have to give it more 
attention” [39].  
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Files were stolen from TFI International's Canpar Express 
and leaked onto the dark web after a ransomware attack 
targeted this Canadian trucking and logistic company's 
courier subsidiaries. The ransom was not paid, and TFI was 











targeted in the 
ransomware 
attacks.  
The data release 
suggested that 
TFI likely 
decided not to 
pay the ransom.  
TFI declined to 
comment further on the 
ransomware attack 
themselves. They said 
"We continue to meet 
most customer shipping 
needs, and we are not 
aware of any misuse of 
client information. Out 
of an abundance of 
caution we want to make 
our clients aware of the 
incident, should you be 
experiencing any issues 
(August 2020).  
Not explicitly mentioned 
other than making the clients 





In early April, Maersk was hit by a worm named NotPetya, 
which locked access to systems that the company uses to 
operate shipping terminals worldwide. No data was lost, and 
ships operated normally throughout the period the systems 
were down. Although, for up to two days, the affected 
terminals could not move cargo [46].  
Temporary 
shutdown of 






There were many 
workarounds to keep 
business going. After 
two weeks, business was 
back to normal (June 
2017).  
The attack was able to exploit 
technological, procedural, and 
behavioral weaknesses for 





On July 24, 2018, a cyber-attack took place on the shipping 
agency's digital assets affecting communication in the 
American region. This affected the carrier’s ability to 









disabled in the 
attack. 
Caused a loss of 
$250-$300 
million.   
About 5 days after the 
incident, Cosco 
announced in a customer 
advisory from its 
Shanghai headquarters 
that "its network 
applications in the 
Americas had been fully 
recovered” (7/30/2018) 
[111].   
Cosco mentioned it would 
conduct its operations via 
remote access, to ensure 
uninterrupted service to the 
Americas. 
FedEx 
June 2017  
Type: Petya cyber 
attack 
A subsidiary of Fed Ex, TNT Express fell victim to the Petya 
cyber-attack. TNT's operations in Europe were disrupted by 
the attack causing significant financial loss due to lower-
than-expected results in first quarter earnings [112].  




may not be 
able to 
recover all of 
the systems 
affected in the 
attack. 
$300 million In August, TNT resolved 
to using WhatsApp for 
internal communication 
due to the email system 
still be inaccessible. 
Customer volumes were 
restored to expected 
levels (September 2017). 
They mentioned the plan to 
instill confidence with 
customers so that they can 
fully meet their expectations.  
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OceanLotus (aka APT32), believed to be a Vietnam-backed 
group that targets threats, targeted BMW in 2019. This 
software installed a Cobalt Strike testing tool to remotely spy 
on machines. The hackers were blocked in December 2019. 
The attackers did not breach the central data center in 




N/A BMW’s cybersecurity 
team was able to notice 
the attack and carefully 
monitor the group’s 
activity, before kicking 
out the attackers in 
December.  
BMW made a general 
statement saying, "We have 
implemented structures and 
processes that minimize the 
risk of unauthorized external 
access to our systems and 
allow us to quickly detect, 
reconstruct, and recover in the 
event of an incident" 
(December 2019) [113]. 
 
Appendix III: Election Sector 
Entity, Date, 
and Type of 
Attack 







It was discovered that Trump's campaign website was 
hacked. Hackers claimed to have compromised multiple 
devices which gained them access to "internal and secret 
conversations of the president" and classified information. 
The hackers were seeking cryptocurrency. The site visitors 
were invited to donate cryptocurrency to two different funds: 
one labeled "Yes, share the data" and the other "No, do not 
share the data". The payments solicited were in Monero, 
which is a difficult to trace cryptocurrency. The message also 
said, "After the deadline, we will compare funds and execute 
the will of the world." Tim Murtaugh, a spokesman for the 
Trump campaign, confirmed that there was no exposure of 
sensitive data because none of it is stored on the site [114].  
N/A; website 
was restored 
N/A The website was 
restored, and the 
Trump campaign said 
they were working 
with law enforcement 
authorities to 
investigate the source 




hacking groups that 
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April 2016  
Type: Phishing 
attack 
Hackers created a fake email account to send phishing emails 
to over 30 Clinton staffers. The emails included a link that 
directed to a document titled "hillaryclinton-favorable-
rating.xlsx". This led to a website operated by the hackers. 
The hackers were able to use stolen credentials to access the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee network, 










N/A The counsel 
investigating Russian 
interference in the 
2016 election issued 
an indictment of 12 
Russian intelligence 
officers in the hacking 
of the Democratic 
National Committee 
and the Clinton 
Campaign (July 2018) 
[54].   
They worked with the 







Trustwave, a global cybersecurity company, says a hacker 
was selling information on 186 million U.S. voters. Much of 
the data is publicly available, but names, email addresses, 
and voter registration records were found for sale on the dark 
web. While voter registration data is publicly available in 
most states, email addresses are often not a part of the public 
data. The databases were listed for sale by "Greenmoon2019" 
which would allow for malicious acts by targeting email 
addresses of only registered Democrats or only registered 








N/A Trustwave said in a 
statement that they are 
committed to 
investigating fraud 
during the election. 
They assured that the 
FBI is closely working 
with their federal, 
state, and local 
partners to safeguard 
the voting process 
(October 2020). 
Working with FBI to 






One of the largest cybersecurity companies in the United 
States, FireEye, said that on Tuesday, December 8th, foreign 
government hackers with "world-class capabilities" broke 
into their network and stole tools that they use to test the 
defenses of thousands of customers including federal, state, 
and local governments. FireEye's CEO, Kevin Mandia, 
released in a statement that the attacker "primarily sought 
information related to certain government customers." 
Mandia also stated that he has concluded that the attack was 






tools used to 
test customer 
security 
Potential loss of 
customers. Stock price 
went down after the 
reveal of the attacks.  
FireEye is 
investigating the 
attack with the FBI 
and Microsoft Corp. 
They are publishing 
information that can 
help to neutralize the 
tools that were stolen 
(December 2020 and 
ongoing) [115].  
FireEye is working to 
innovate and adapt to 
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The United States traced the massive cyberespionage 
operation against the 2008 presidential campaigns of Barack 
Obama and John McCain back to the People's Republic of 
China. The goal of the campaign intrusion was to export 
internal data from both campaigns, including internal 
position papers and private emails to gain leverage with the 
winner of the election. The intrusion into the campaign's 
computer networks continued for months after first being 
detected by the FBI in the summer of 2008. The attack was 
delivered by a "phishing" email that contained an attachment 
with sophisticated malware that infiltrated throughout the 






Theft of intellectual 
property costs the U.S. 
money. A report from 
the former Intelligence 
Director Blair and the 
former U.S. 
Ambassador to China 
estimated this theft 
(mostly from China) to 
be costing the U.S. 
around $300 billion per 
year. 
The campaign 
dispatched a computer 
security team from 
Kroll Advisory 
Solutions to Chicago 
to cleanse the infected 
computers. Chinese 
officials have denied 
any role in cyber-
attacks against the 
U.S. government and 
private enterprise 
(2013) [49].  
More cyber security 
measures were taken 
and improved upon 










Two days before the final round of the French presidential 
elections, data hacked from Macron’s presidential campaign 
team were released online. Nearly 14.5 gigabytes of emails, 
personal and business documents were posted to the site 
Pastebin through links to more than 70,000 files. Officials 
from Macron’s party said that the attackers mixed fake 
documents and authentic ones to create confusion and 




N/A The attack failed to 
influence the electoral 
process. Macron still 
won the election. 
Factors such as 
anticipation and 
reaction by the 
Macron campaign 
staff, government, and 
civil society and 
mainstream media can 
be attributed to 
resisting the attempted 
Russian influence 
(May 2017) [68].  
The increase of further 
prevention of 
"information 
laundering" in the 
media due to the 
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In 2007, the Estonian government decided to move the 
Bronze Soldier, a symbol of Soviet oppression. This decision 
led to protests which were exacerbated by false Russian news 
reports that claimed the statue was being destroyed. In this 
rioting, 156 people were injured, one person died, and 1,000 
people were detained. The day after the physical destruction, 
cyber-attacks affected online services of Estonian banks, 
media outlets, and government bodies. The massive spam 
that was sent by botnets generated large amounts of online 
requests, overloading servers. Estonians were unable to use 
online banking services, government employees were unable 
to email, and newspapers could not deliver news. The attacks 
came from Russian IP addresses and Russian language was 













web services at 
emergency rates are 
estimated to have cost 
billions of Euro. 
The attacks ceased on 
May 19, 2007. In 
January 2008, the 
Estonian government 
indicted one of the 
responsible hackers 
(5/19/2007) [67].  
In May 2008, the 
Estonian Ministry of 
Defense implemented a 
National Cyber 
Security Strategy [66].  
 
